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Bankruptcy
by Hon. James D. Walker, Jr.*
and Amber Nickell"
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2009 the country entered into a significant recession, but bankruptcy law-perhaps surprisingly-remained relatively static, at least in the
Eleventh Circuit. On a national level, things were a bit more interesting; the Chrysler bankruptcy was much discussed in the media and
there was a renewed interest in allowing individuals to modify primary
residence mortgages in bankruptcy. Still, even the collapse of the
housing market could not move Congress to amend the Bankruptcy
Code. Despite the action on a national level, in the Eleventh Circuit it
was business as usual with a year that can best be described as
unremarkable.'
II.

ADMINISTRATION & PROCEDURE

Judicial Estoppel
Judicial estoppel is the application of an equitable principle designed
to prevent litigants from making a mockery of the judicial system by
taking inconsistent positions in different courts.2 In recent years, the
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1. For analysis of Eleventh Circuit bankruptcy law during the prior survey period, see
Hon. James D. Walker, Jr. & Amber Nickell, Bankruptcy, 2008 Eleventh Circuit Survey,
60 MERCER L. REV. 1141 (2009).

2. See, e.g., Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1282, 1285 (11th Cir. 2002). The
doctrine often arises in situations such as in the Burnes case-that is, when a debtor fails
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United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has provided a
framework for evaluating judicial estoppel claims in the context of
Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 cases. 3
In Grelier v.Burgess (In re Grelier),4 the United States Bankruptcy
Court for the Northern District of Alabama was faced with a scenario
not previously addressed by the Eleventh Circuit: an individual Chapter
11 debtor had referenced a potential legal malpractice claim against her
divorce attorney in her Chapter 11 plan but not in any other document
filed with the bankruptcy court.5 The debtor filed her bankruptcy
petition in July 2007. She became aware of her potential malpractice
claim no later than November 2007, and she did not amend her
schedules after learning of the claim. She filed her disclosure statement
and Chapter 11 plan in January 2008.6 The disclosure statement did
the
not mention the malpractice claim. The plan simply reserved
7
debtor's right to prosecute claims against the divorce attorney.
After the plan was confirmed and the debtor's bankruptcy case was
closed, the debtor sued her divorce attorney for malpractice. The
attorney had the bankruptcy case reopened and the malpractice case
removed to the bankruptcy court, where he raised a defense of judicial
estoppel."
The bankruptcy court looked to the totality of the circumstances to
determine that the malpractice case could not go forward.9 The court
noted that the debtor made no effort to amend her schedules to reflect
the claim.1" Furthermore, omitting the claim from the disclosure
statement resulted in the debtor's failure "to include 'adequate information' . . . sufficient to allow creditors to make an informed judgment

about the debtor's plan of reorganization." 1 Placing a reservation of
the right to sue in the plan "was too little too late to fully inform

to disclose a non-bankruptcy cause of action in his bankruptcy schedules and then attempts
to pursue the undisclosed cause of action in state court. See id. at 1283-84.
3. See Ajaka v. Brooksamerica Mortgage Corp., 453 F.3d 1339, 1344 (11th Cir. 2006);
Parker v. Wendy's Int'l, Inc. (In re Parker), 365 F.3d 1268, 1271 (11th Cir. 2004); Barger
v. City of Cartersville, 348 F.3d 1289, 1293-94 (11th Cir. 2003); DeLeon v. ComCar Indus.,
Inc., 321 F.3d 1289, 1291 (11th Cir. 2003); Burnes, 291 F.3d 1285.
4. 400 B.R. 826 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2009).
5. Id. at 828.
6. Id. at 827-28. The plan provided a twenty-seven percent dividend to unsecured
creditors. Id. at 830.
7. Id. at 828.
8. Id. at 828-29.
9. Id. at 830.
10. Id. at 829.
11. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1125 (2006)).
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creditors about the potential asset."12 In holding that the debtor was
estopped from continuing the malpractice case, the court noted that the
debtor's actions gave her "an unfair advantage at confirmation" over
both the malpractice defendant and other creditors entitled to vote. 3
B.

Barton Doctrine

The case of Lawrence v. Goldberg4 also involved a debtor whose
litigation was cut off by the court, but under very different circumstances. In this case, a Chapter 7 debtor who refused to turn over approximately $7 million worth of estate property that he had concealed in an
offshore trust was first fined and then incarcerated by the bankruptcy
court for contempt. In response, the debtor filed suit alleging conspiracy
and various other violations of state and federal laws against the
trustee, the trustee's counsel, the trustee's investigator, and certain
based on lack of
creditors. 5 The district court dismissed the1 case
6
affirmed.
Circuit
Eleventh
the
and
jurisdiction,
In the Eleventh Circuit, the Barton doctrine" requires a debtor to
seek approval from the bankruptcy court before suing "'the trustee or
other bankruptcy-court-appointed officer, for acts done in the actor's
official capacity.'"' 8 At issue in Lawrence was whether the Barton
doctrine applied to all the defendants in the debtor's lawsuit. 9 The
Eleventh Circuit held that the doctrine applied.2 ° The trustee was
covered by virtue of being appointed by the court.2' Furthermore, the
trustee's employment of both counsel and an investigator were approved
by the court, "function[ing] as the equivalent of court-appointed officers
by helping the Trustee execute his official duties."22 Finally, the
creditor defendants also acted as court-appointed officers "to the extent

12. Id. at 830.
13. Id. at 831.
14. 573 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 2009).
15. Id. at 1267-68.
16. Id. at 1269.
17. See Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126, 137 (1881). In Barton the United States
Supreme Court held that a receiver cannot be sued for negligence in the performance of his
duties without leave of the court. Id.
18. Lawrence, 573 F.3d at 1269 (quoting Carter v. Rodgers, 220 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th
Cir. 2000)).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1270.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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[they] financed the Trustee's efforts to locate hidden assets" and such
financing was approved by the bankruptcy court.23
Not only did the Barton doctrine apply to all the defendants, but it
also applied to all eighteen counts of the debtor's complaint because at
the core of the complaint were allegations that the defendants colluded
to enforce turnover of the trust assets.2 4 As such, the outcome of the
lawsuit "could have an effect on the handling and administration of [the
debtor's] bankruptcy estate."
C. Eligibility
Section 109 of the Bankruptcy Code2" sets forth various eligibility
requirements for bankruptcy, including the debtor's obligation to obtain
pre-petition credit counseling. 27 In In re Wise, 28 a creditor sought
dismissal of the case because the debtor obtained credit counseling on
the same day she filed her petition. 29 Although the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Alabama had previously
held that a debtor must obtain the credit counseling at least a day before
filing,3" the same bankruptcy court, here, denied the creditor's motion. 1 The court held that the motion was untimely because it was
raised after confirmation of the debtor's Chapter 13 plan.3 2
In reaching its decision, the bankruptcy court rejected the creditor's
argument that § 109 implicates subject matter jurisdiction.3 3 The court
looked to the statute and noted that (1) it "contains no 'jurisdictional language'"; (2) it only places limitations on the debtors, not on the courts;
and (3) it does not require the court to make its own investigation into
a debtor's eligibility.34 Overall the bankruptcy court held that the
credit counseling requirement is nonjurisdictional; therefore, it can be

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
2008).
31.
32.

Id.
Id. at 1271.
Id.
11 U.S.C. § 109 (2006).
Id. § 109(h)(2).
415 B.R. 579 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2009).
Id. at 580.
In re Hammonds, No 08-40928, 2008 WL 4830071, at *4 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Sept. 22,
In re Wise, 415 B.R. at 580.
Id. at 581.

33. Id. at 583.
34.

Id.
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waived." In this case, the creditor waived its right to object based on
a credit counseling defect by its delay in raising the issue.36
III. PROFESSIONALS
Attorneys should not assume that keeping detailed time records will
result in a fee enhancement in a routine Chapter 7 case. In In re
Gonzalez, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District
of Florida reaffirmed its decision to set a reasonable fee in a standard
Chapter 7 case at a figure of $1500.8 Consequently, the court directed
the debtor's attorney to show cause why his fees-shown in a disclosure
statement to be $2050-should not be disgorged.3 9 To show cause, the
attorney provided a detailed billing statement that showed he worked
8.13 hours at a rate of $250 per hour.40 Nevertheless, the docket
showed the case to be routine, requiring "no additional court activity,
such as other hearings, contested matters or contentions that required
the presence of the Debtor or his attorney at a hearing and/or mandated
additional services to be provided by counsel for the Debtor."4 1
Therefore, even though the additional fees represented actual hours
worked, the court ordered the attorney to disgorge his fees in excess of
$1500.42 The same outcome might be expected in a Chapter 13 case
with similar facts. Courts are much more likely to set a predetermined
reasonable fee amount in Chapter 13 cases.
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Georgia
also addressed attorney fees in In re Hall;43 however, the issue in Hall
was about who earned the fees, not whether the fees were reasonable.44
In Hall the debtor retained an Alabama attorney to pursue a medical
malpractice claim. The Alabama attorney in turn contacted a Georgia
attorney to handle the case. The debtor understood that the attorneys
would share a forty-five percent contingency fee of any recovery he
received. The two attorneys agreed to a fee-splitting arrangement in
which the Alabama attorney would receive forty percent of the contingency fee and the Georgia attorney would receive sixty percent. After

35. Id.
36. Id. at 581.
37. 402 B.R. 900 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2009).
38. Id. at 901. Setting a court-approved reasonable fee is somewhat unusual for
Chapter 7 cases.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 902.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. 415 B.R. 911 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2009).
44. See id. at 920.

1038

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

hiring the attorneys, the debtor filed for bankruptcy. He listed the suit
in his schedules and listed the Georgia attorney as his counsel in the
malpractice action. The Chapter 7 trustee succeeded to the debtor's
interest in the malpractice claim and entered into a separate agreement
with the Georgia attorney to prosecute the claim. The malpractice case
was ultimately settled with approximately $360,000 paid to the Georgia
attorney for his services."
Upon learning of the settlement, the Alabama attorney pursued an
administrative claim in the bankruptcy case, alleging that he was
entitled to a portion of the fee paid to the Georgia attorney.46 After
first determining the Alabama attorney had standing to bring his claim,
the court considered the validity of the original contingency fee
agreement.4 7 The court held that the contingency agreement was
deemed rejected because the trustee never sought approval to accept the
agreement.48 Consequently, the Alabama attorney had a pre-petition
claim for damages, which was to be determined by state law.49 Because
there had not yet been any recovery on the malpractice claim at the time
of rejection, the Alabama attorney was not entitled to a share of the
contingency fee.5" In addition, the attorney was not entitled to fees
under quantum meruit because he did not produce proof as to the value
of his services. 1 Finally, the court held that the Alabama attorney was
not entitled to fees under 11 U.S.C. § 32852 because his services did not
benefit the trustee or the bankruptcy estate.53 At best, he occasionally
offered words of reassurance to the debtor, but he did not actually
participate in the prosecution of the case.'
The court concluded that any dispute the Alabama attorney had with
the Georgia attorney belonged in state court, not bankruptcy court.55
Implicit in the court's holding was that attorneys who provide services
fees without obtaining prior
to debtors should not expect to receive
56
approval by the bankruptcy court.

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 915-19.
Id. at 920.
Id. at 922.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 923.
Id.
11 U.S.C. § 328 (2006).
In re Hall, 415 B.R. at 924.
Id.
Id. at 926.
See id. at 925-26.
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BANKRUPTCY ESTATE

Sometimes answering an apparently simple question-whether certain
property is property of the estate-can result in a winding trip through
multiple provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. The facts of In re Morrison 57 set the relatively unusual stage. The debtor and her husband
filed a joint Chapter 13 case. About a year after the plan was confirmed,
the husband committed suicide. The wife then converted her case to
Chapter 7. Shortly thereafter, she received $10,000 in life insurance
proceeds. The Chapter 7 trustee sought turnover of the money on the
ground that it was estate property.58 The United States Bankruptcy
Court for the Middle District of Florida initially held in favor of the
trustee; 9 however, it reached a different decision on the debtor's motion
for reconsideration.'
Originally, the court held that under 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6) 61 the life
insurance payout entered the estate.62 However, the joint Chapter 13
petition filed by the debtor and her husband created two separate
bankruptcy estates.'
The debtor's expectancy interest in the life
insurance policy was not property of her Chapter 13 estate.' Rather,
the policy had been property of her husband's separate bankruptcy
estate. 65 Consequently, the payout was not proceeds of property of the
debtor's estate, and § 541(a)(6) was inapplicable.66
The court then turned to 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(5),67 which provides that
a debtor's post-petition receipt of a life insurance payout becomes
property of the estate if the debtor becomes entitled to the payout within
180 days of the petition date.68 In this case, the debtor's husband died
more than a year after the petition date and well outside the 180-day
period.69 Once again, § 541(a) offered no basis for bringing the life
insurance proceeds into the debtor's estate.7 v

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

403 B.R. 895 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2009).
Id. at 897-98.
Id. at 898.
Id. at 905.
11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6) (2006).
In re Morrison, 403 B.R. at 898.
See id. at 899-901.
Id. at 899.
Id.
Id.
11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(5) (2006).
Id.; In re Morrison, 403 B.R. at 902.
In re Morrison, 403 B.R. at 903.
Id.
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Because the debtor became entitled to the life insurance payout while
still in Chapter 13, the court next turned to 11 U.S.C. § 1306(a),71
which provides that property acquired by a Chapter 13 debtor postpetition is property of the estate.72 But § 1306 could not be read in
isolation; therefore, the court read it in tandem with 11 U.S.C. § 348(f)
73
(1),
which defines estate property in a case converted from Chapter 13

to Chapter 7 as "property of the estate, as of the date of filing of the
petition."74 In other words, the debtor's Chapter 7 estate did not
include property that entered the estate under § 1306. 7' Therefore, the
court held that the life insurance proceeds were property of the debtor
rather than her bankruptcy estate.78
V. CLAIMS
Not all awards in a divorce proceeding are considered domestic
support obligations, as the debtor's ex-husband learned in In re Lopez.77
In this case, the issue was whether the ex-husband's claim was entitled
to priority under 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1)(A)78 as a domestic support
obligation.79 A domestic support obligation is defined as being "in the
nature of alimony, maintenance, or support." ° The ex-husband's claim
was based on an award of attorney fees in the divorce proceeding."
After reviewing the state court order, the United States Bankruptcy
Court for the Southern District of Florida concluded that the fees were
awarded not on the basis of the parties' respective abilities to pay but
rather on the debtor's bad faith and misconduct during the course of the
divorce proceedings.8 2 Such an award is not in the nature of support;8 3 therefore,
it is not a domestic support obligation entitled to
84
priority.

71. 11 U.S.C. § 1306(a) (2006).
72. Id.; In re Morrison, 403 B.R. at 903.
73. 11 U.S.C. § 348(f)(1) (2006).
74. In re Morrisson, 403 B.R. at 903 (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting 11 U.S.C. § 348(f)(1)).
75. Id. at 903-04.
76. Id. at 904-05.
77. 405 B.R. 382 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2009).
78. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1)(A) (2006).
79. In re Lopez, 405 B.R. at 383.
80. 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A)(B) (2006).
81. In re Lopez, 405 B.R. at 383.
82. Id. at 385.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 386.
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AVOIDANCE

When a trustee seeks to recover a pre-petition payment by way of a
preference action, he or she must prove five elements of the claim,
including that the payment was made on account of an antecedent
debt."5 In Midwest Holding #7, LLC v. Anderson (In re Tanner Family,
LLC), 6 the trustee sought to recover an early termination payment
under a lease. The debtor and creditor had entered into a five-year lease
agreement, under which the debtor agreed to make monthly payments.
Three years later, the debtor sought to terminate the lease and agreed
to pay $87,172.50 in satisfaction of its lease obligations. Less than
ninety
days after making the payment, the debtor filed for bankrupt7
cy.

8

The only issue in the case was whether the lease termination payment
was made on account of antecedent debt."8 The court defined an
antecedent debt as one that "is pre-existing or is incurred before the
transfer."" The creditor argued that the debt was not incurred until
the first of each month when rent became due. The trustee countered
that the entire debt was incurred when the lease was signed.9"
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit looked to
the Bankruptcy Code's definitions of debt and claim to answer the
question.91 The Eleventh Circuit determined that "a debtor incurs a
debt to a creditor when the creditor has a claim against the debtor, even
if the claim is unliquidated, unmatured, unfixed, or contingent."9 2
Thus, the debtor's obligation to pay the creditor arose at the time the
lease was signed.9 3 Furthermore, "[tihe fact that Debtor's liability
matured only periodically as each month's rent became due and payable
.. does not mean that the debt was not incurred upon execution of the
lease."94 The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the termination payment
was made on account of an antecedent debt and was subject to recovery
by the trustee as a preference. 9

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (2006).
556 F.3d 1194 (11th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 1195.
Id. at 1196.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 1197.
Id.
Id. at 1198.
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The Eleventh Circuit addressed another preference issue in Carrier
Corp. v. Buckley (In re Globe Manufacturing Corp.).6 The debtor had
purchased a climate control system from Carrier for $1.25 million to be
paid in six installments. Ninety days before the debtor filed for
bankruptcy, the debtor paid two of the six installments. The trustee
later sued to recover these two payments. Carrier argued that the
payments were not preferential because they did not improve Carrier's
position relative to other creditors.9"
The fifth element of a preference requires the trustee to prove that the
transfer "enabl[ed] the creditor to receive more than it would have
received had the debtor's estate been liquidated under Chapter 7. "s9
Carrier had failed to take a security interest in the climate control
system, and consequently held an unsecured claim. 99 Nevertheless,
Carrier argued that the payments at issue did not improve its position
because it had the right to secure its claim by asserting a mechanic's
lien against the debtor."° However, any such lien could only have
been filed against the entire real estate and not against the specific
system installed by Carrier.'0 ' Furthermore, Carrier failed to file a
lien.1 ' And even if it had done so, there was no equity in the debtor's
property to which it could attach because of the existence of a prior
Furthermore, even the secured lenders in the case were
mortgage.'
facing a deficiency."' Thus, the Eleventh Circuit found "no merit to
Carrier's suggestion that it would have been paid in full even if the
preferential payments had not been made" and allowed the trustee to
recover the payments as a preference. °5

96. 567 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2009).
97. Id. at 1295-96. Carrier also raised an ordinary course of business defense. Id. at
1297. The court quickly rejected that defense because the creditor failed to offer any proof

as to industry standards and because it had no prior dealings with the debtor. See id. at
1298-1300.

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 1296.
Id.
Id. at 1296-97.
See id. at 1297.
Id. at 1296-97.
Id. at 1297.
Id.
Id.
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AUTOMATIC STAY AND DISCHARGE INJUNCTION

A.

Punitive Damages
The automatic stay"~ and discharge injunction. 7 protect debtors
from debt collection efforts during the pendency of a bankruptcy case
and after the debtor receives a discharge, respectively."° Creditors
who violate either injunction may face sanctions.'
In the following
two cases, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District
of Florida considered whether those sanctions should include punitive
damages.
In In re White,"' the offending creditor was listed in the debtor's
schedules and received notice by first-class mail of the bankruptcy filing.
Nevertheless, the creditor began phoning the debtor post-petition in an
effort to collect its debt. The debtor sent the creditor an e-mail
reminding it of the bankruptcy and asking it to stop the collection
efforts. The creditor responded by contacting the debtor's family and
friends about the debt. Consequently, the debtor sought sanctions
against the creditor, including punitive damages, for violating the
automatic stay."
In Nibbelink v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In re Nibbelink),112 the
Chapter 13 debtors proposed paying their mortgage through their plan;
they had no mortgage arrearages."' The plan provided that upon its
successful completion, the debtors' mortgage would "be deemed current
as a matter of law.""' The debtors made all their plan payments and
received a discharge. Less than a month later, the debtors received a
statement from the mortgage lender with charges of $3,486.20 for
overdue payments and $298 in late fees. The debtors' attempts to
resolve the charges in writing were ignored by the creditor, which
threatened foreclosure." 5 The debtors filed suit against the creditor

106. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2006).
107. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) (2006).
108. 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a), 524(a).
109. See In re White, 410 B.R. 322, 324 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2009) (noting that the
violation of the automatic stay can result in liability for damages); Nibbelink v. Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A., (In re Nibbelink), 403 B.R. 113, 119-20 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2009) (noting that
a court may award actual damages for the violation of the discharge injunction).
110. 410 B.R. 322 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2009).
111. Id. at 325.
112. 403 B.R. 113 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2009).
113. Id. at 116.
114. Id. at 116-17.
115. Id. at 117.
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for violation of the discharge injunction. 1 6 The creditor failed to
answer, and the court entered a default judgment in favor of the
debtors." 7 It then considered the issue of damages, including punitive
damages."'8
The court in In re White and Nibbelink concluded that punitive
damages are appropriate "when the violator acts in an 'egregious,
In In re White, the court further explained
intentional manner.'""'
that egregious conduct may be evidenced by the creditor's "willful
disrespect or arrogant defiance of the bankruptcy laws" or when the
creditor has engaged in "a pattern of abusive conduct."120 In both
cases, the court awarded punitive damages.12 ' The court in In re
White awarded $10,000 for the creditor's violation of the stay by calling
the debtor and her family and friends to try and collect a pre-petition
debt. 2 2 In Nibbelink the court awarded $15,000 for the creditor's
its
attempt to charge fees that the court described as "improper" and
123
refusal to respond to the debtor's efforts to resolve the problem.
B.

CriminalProceedings
In Griggs v. City of Gadsden Revenue Department,124 the debtor-who owned a lounge-filed for bankruptcy after being convicted of
several municipal offenses related to liquor sales and being placed on
probation. Her filing occurred two weeks prior to a scheduled probation
revocation hearing. During the period between her bankruptcy filing
and the probation hearing, the debtor was served with a summons for
the hearing, and her business was searched to confirm the presence of
certain property. At the hearing, her probation was revoked for
operating
a business without a license, and she was jailed for four
25
1

days.

As a result, the debtor sought relief against the city and its officials
for violations of the automatic stay, arguing that they used the criminal
proceedings to try to collect a debt. The case was removed from the

116. Id. at 119.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. In re White, 410 B.R. at 327 (quoting In re Hedetneimi, 297 B.R. 837,843 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 2003)); In re Nibbelink, 403 B.R. at 122 (citing In re Hedetneirni,297 B.R. at 843).

120. 410 B.R. at 327.
121. Id. at 328; In re Nibbelink, 403 B.R. at 122.
122. In re White, 410 B.R. at 328.
123. 403 B.R. at 122.
124. 327 F. App'x 186 (11th Cir. 2009).
125. Id. at 187.
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bankruptcy court to the district court at the defendants' request. 126
The district court found the city's proceedings against the debtor were
an exercise of the city's regulatory power, thus constituting an exception
to the automatic stay provisions. 27 The district court granted summary judgment in favor
of the defendants 2 ' and the Eleventh Circuit
129
affirmed on appeal.
The Eleventh Circuit held that the debtor failed to prove the actions
against her were a subterfuge for collecting a debt because the debtor
failed to show that the defendants "criminally charged her with
operating a business without a license in order to frustrate the
bankruptcy judge's jurisdiction to discharge her debts." 3 ° The debtor
cited Barnette v. Evans 3 ' for the proposition that the stay applies to
criminal proceedings when: "(1) the complaining witness brings the
criminal proceeding as a 'bad faith' subterfuge to collect a debt and (2)
the defendant can not raise as a defense in the criminal proceeding the
fact that the prosecution was instituted to collect a debt." 3 2 The
Eleventh Circuit rejected the debtor's argument with respect to the
Barnett rule because the debtor's evidence was insufficient to show "bad
faith." 33 Ultimately, the Eleventh Circuit held in Griggs, that the
automatic stay did not apply because the fines and imprisonment were
not debts that could be discharged in the bankruptcy case."'

VIII.
A.

DISCHARGE

Dischargeby PlanProvision

One of the unresolved questions of bankruptcy law is whether a debtor
can discharge an otherwise nondischargeable debt by providing for the
debt in his plan. After this year's survey period ended, the Supreme
Court addressed a similar issue in the context of a student loan in a
Chapter 13 case. 13'
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id.
Id. at 187-88 (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(b)(1), (4) (2006)).
Id. at 187.
Id. at 188.
Id.
673 F.2d 1250 (11th Cir. 1982).
Griggs, 327 F. App'x at 188.
Id.
Id.
See United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. 1367 (2010).
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Middle District of Florida recently
tackled the question as it relates to
36
tax debt in a Chapter 11 case.'
In Newman v. United States (In re Newman),' 37 the debtor had more
than $200,000 in tax debt that had accrued in the mid-1990s. Most of
the debt was characterized as either secured or priority tax debt. The
debtor's plan proposed to pay the secured and priority tax debt in full,
but proposed to pay only half of the approximately $41,000 that was
deemed a general unsecured claim. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
did not object to the plan, which was confirmed. The debtor paid his tax
debts in accordance with the plan.' 38
After the case was closed, the IRS began pursuing the unpaid general
unsecured tax debt by issuing tax liens and levies. The debtor sued the
IRS, claiming its collection efforts violated the discharge injunction of 11
U.S.C. § 524. ' 39 The IRS countered that the plan did not discharge the
taxes because they were nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(1)(A)' 4 ° and 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)."' The court agreed with
the IRS.' 42 The court based its decision on the language of 11 U.S.C.
§ 1141(d)(2),143 which provides that a Chapter 11 discharge "does not
discharge a debtor who is an individual from any debt excepted from
discharge under section 523 of this title."1"
It appears from the
opinion that neither party filed an adversary proceeding to determine
the dischargeability of the taxes. Nevertheless, the court noted that
"[ft]he Debtor does not appear to dispute the nondischargeable character
of the liabilities."145 In addition, the court attached no significance to
the IRS's failure to object to the plan, explaining that the statute does
not condition a debt's nondischargeability on a confirmation objection by
the creditor.'4 6 For these reasons, the court concluded that the IRS
was free to pursue the debtor for unpaid tax liabilities even after the
debtor received a discharge. 4 7 However, based on the Supreme

136.
2009).
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

See Newman v. United States (In re Newman), 402 B.R. 908 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
402 B.R. 908 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2009).
Id. at 910-11.
11 U.S.C. § 524 (2006); In re Newman, 402 B.R. at 911.
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(A) (2006).
11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8) (2006); In re Newman, 402 B.R. at 911.
In re Newman, 402 B.R. at 912.
11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(2) (2006).
Id.; In re Newman, 402 B.R. at 912.
In re Newman, 402 B.R. at 912.
Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(2)).
Id. at 916.
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Court's decision in United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa,148 a
similar case might produce a different outcome if the plan includes a
provision specifically stating the taxes are to be discharged and if the
creditor fails to object. 49
Discharge and CollateralEstoppel
In Williamson v. Williamson (In re Williamson),5 ' the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Georgia considered
whether the standard for involuntary conversion based on fraud and the
standard for denial of discharge based on fraud are identical for
purposes of collateral estoppel. 5' In this case, the debtor filed a
Chapter 12 petition. When he sought a voluntary dismissal, the United
States Trustee asked the court to convert the case to Chapter 7
instead.152 The court ordered the case converted, finding "instances of
concealment, false statements, and omissions that collectively evidence
an intent to manipulate the bankruptcy process."153 These findings
were based on the debtor's failure to disclose his bank accounts-even
when asked directly about the accounts during a 2004 examination-and
his failure to disclose ownership of a business.1 4 He also failed to
disclose a crop disaster claim, lied about the balance of his bank
accounts in his Chapter 12 monthly reports, and destroyed or damaged
a secured creditor's collateral.155
Under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4)(A), 5 6 the court may deny a discharge if
B.

"the debtor knowingly and fraudulently .

.

. or in connection with the

148. 130 S. Ct. 1367 (2010).
149. The Court in Espinosa explained that bankruptcy courts have an "obligation ...
to direct a [Chapter 13] debtor to conform his plan to the requirements of" 11 U.S.C. § 1328
(2006), the Chapter 13 discharge statute. 130 S. Ct. at 1381. Nonetheless, the Court held
that a student-loan creditor could not use Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4), FED. R.
CIV. P. 60(b)(4), to collaterally attack the bankruptcy court's confirmation order, which
partially discharged student loans without the requisite finding of undue hardship. 130
S. Ct. at 1380. The creditor had the opportunity to object to the confirmation of the plan
but failed to do so; thus, the creditor was "afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate."

Id.
150. 414 B.R. 895 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2009).
151. Id. at 900.
152. Id. at 896. Under 11 U.S.C. § 1208(d) (2006), a court may convert a case to
Chapter 7 "upon a showing that the debtor has committed fraud in connection with the
case." Id.
153. In re Williamson, 414 B.R. at 896.
154. Id. at 897-98.
155. Id.
156. 11 U.S.C. § 727(aX4)(A) (2006).
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case--(A) made a false oath or account."157 For collateral estoppel to
prevent relitigation of the question of fraud, the proponent of collateral
estoppel must show identity of issues; actual litigation of the issue; that
the issue was necessary to the judgment in the prior action; and an
equivalent burden of persuasion in both actions. 5 ' In this case, only
identity of issues was contested.'5 9 The debtor argued that the
definition of fraud in the context of § 727 is more narrow than in the
context of 11 U.S.C. § 1208'60 because it requires the debtor to have
knowledge of the fraud.' 6 ' Without specifically accepting or rejecting
the debtor's argument, the court pointed out that it had, in fact, made
a finding that the debtor had engaged in knowingly fraudulent acts
when considering the motion to convert. 16 2 Therefore, the court
concluded that the identity of issues element was satisfied, and it
applied collateral estoppel to deny the debtor a discharge based on
fraud.163

IX. CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY
Means Test
The means test set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)'" comes into play
in both Chapter 7 and Chapter 13. In Chapter 7, failure to satisfy the
means test creates a presumption of abuse, which can lead to dismissal
of the case.'" In Chapter 13, the means test is used to determine the
disposable income of an above-median-income debtor.'"
The presumption of abuse arises in a Chapter 7 case if the debtor's
current monthly income minus the deductions set forth in § 707(b)(2)(A)
(ii), (iii), and (iv) falls outside of certain limits. 167 Pursuant to § 707(b)
(2)(A)(iii), the debtor may subtract from his current monthly income the
payments to be made to secured creditors.'8 These payments are
calculated as "the total of all amounts scheduled as contractually due to

A.

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id.
In re Williamson, 414 B.R. at 900.
See id.
11 U.S.C. § 1208 (2006).
In re Williamson, 414 B.R. at 900.
Id. at 900-01.
Id. at 901.
11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2) (2006).
Id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i).

166.

11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2)-(3) (2006).

167.

See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i).

168. Id. § 707(b)(2(A)(iii).
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secured creditors in each month of the 60 months following the date of
the petition ...

divided by 60."' 69

In In re Norwood-Hill,"1' the issue was whether the debtor could
take deductions for payments she would not actually be making
post-petition. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle
District of Florida identified two approaches to the question: the
snapshot approach and the future-oriented approach.171 Under the
snapshot approach, the means test is applied mechanically to incorporate
any payments on secured debt that are "contractually" due on the
petition date. 7 2 Under the future-oriented approach, the debtor can
only subtract payments she "reasonably expects to pay" during the sixty
months after filing for bankruptcy. 7 3 The court ultimately concluded
that the snapshot approach should apply in Chapter 7 cases, but the
a debtor is calculating
future-oriented approach should apply when
174
case.
13
Chapter
a
for
income
disposable
In a Chapter 13 case, a debtor is obligated to commit all his or her
disposable income to a plan. 75 Consequently, "'it would go against the
very essence of Chapter 13 to allow a debtor to deduct an expense that
is non-existent at the time of confirmation.'"' 76 Conversely, in Chapter
7, Congress based the means test on a historic view of the debtor's
finances, which lends itself to a mechanical approach. 7 Furthermore,
applying the snapshot approach keeps § 707(b)(2) "separate and distinct"
from § 707(b)(3), which provides for dismissal if the court finds abuse
"The means test is
based on the totality of the circumstances.17
while the totality
formula,
mathematical
as
a
strict
to
be
applied
meant
into
account a variety
that
takes
is
a
fluid
test
of the circumstances test
79
of different factors."
Interestingly, a similar issue also came up in the Chapter 13
context-this time dealing with the vehicle ownership deduction in the
means test. In In re Wisham' ° and Spears v. Reding (In re

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
(Bankr.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id.
403 B.R. 905 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2009).
Id. at 909.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 910.
Id. Disposable income is defined in 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2).
In re Norwood-Hill, 403 B.R. at 910 quoting In re Holmes, 395 B.R. 149, 153
M.D. Fla. 2008)).
Id.
Id. at 911; see 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)-(3
In re Norwood-Hill, 403 B.R. at 911.
416 B.R. 790 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2009).
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Spears),'8 1 the debtors sought to subtract a vehicle ownership deduction that exceeded their actual vehicle ownership costs from their
current monthly income. 82 Section 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) provides that the
monthly expenses debtors may deduct from their current monthly
income "shall be the debtor's applicable monthly expense amounts
specified under the National Standards and Local Standards... issued
by the Internal Revenue Service."" One of those standards provides
for a vehicle ownership expense." s As with the secured debt payment
issue, courts are divided as to whether debtors may take a deduction
that exceeds their actual expenses.8 5
Some courts look to the Internal Revenue Manual18 6 for guidance.' 87 The manual provides that "a taxpayer who owns an unencumbered vehicle is only entitled to the operation expenses contained in the
Local Standards, but not the ownership expenses.""a Other courts rely
on the plain language of the statute to conclude that debtors are entitled
to the full ownership deduction without modification based on their
circumstances." 9
The courts in both Wisham and Spears favored the plain-language
approach, noting that the InternalRevenue Manual is not referenced in
the Bankruptcy Code.' 90 Furthermore, § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii) makes a
distinction between actual expenses and applicable expenses.'
The
statute allows "applicable" expenses for the National and Local
Standards but requires debtors to subtract "actual" expenses for those
expenses that fall within the IRS's category of "Other Necessary
Expenses. " 192 The court in Wisham further concluded that by relying
on the IRS standards, "Congress favored the concept of a uniform
formula for determining a debtor's expenses" and "acknowledge[d] the
reality that the owners incur expenses associated with those vehicles
that are independent from debt or financing payments."' 9'

181. 415 B.R. 855 (M.D. Ala. 2009).
182. Id. at 856; In re Wisham, 416 B.R. at 791.
183. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(1).
184. See In re Spears, 415 B.R. at 856.
185. Id.
186. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 5.15.1.9.1.B (2009),
available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part5/irm_05-015-OOI.html#DOe1O87.
187. In re Spears, 415 B.R. at 856.
188. In re Wisham, 416 B.R. at 795; see also INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note
186, § 5.15.1.9.1.B.
189. In re Spears, 415 B.R. at 856.
190. In re Spears, 415 B.R. at 857; In re Wisharn, 416 B.R. at 795-96.
191. 11 U.S.C. § 707(bX2XA)(iiXI).
192. In re Wisharn, 416 B.R. at 797.
193. Id. at 798-99.

2010]

BANKRUPTCY

1051

The court in Spears went a step further, somewhat aligning itself with
the reasoning in Norwood-Hill. The court stated that in Chapter 13, as
opposed to Chapter 7, the analysis does not end with a mechanical
application of the means test. 94 Although the bankruptcy court
cannot skip the means test as a first step in calculating disposable
income, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) 95 "require[s] the bankruptcy court to view
the full-vehicle deduction as merely a presumptive calculation of
disposable income." 96 The presumption can be rebutted with evidence
that better reflects the reality of the debtor's income and expenses.197
The means test and its presumption of abuse arose in yet another
context in In re Tauter,98 in which the United States Bankruptcy
Court for the Middle District of Florida held that the need to repay a
Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) loan is not a special circumstance sufficient
to rebut the presumption of abuse.'9 Prior to bankruptcy, the Chapter
7 debtor borrowed nearly $45,000 from his TSP to consolidate debts. His
monthly payment on the loan was $836.59 in addition to a monthly TSP
contribution of $204.86. On his means test form, the debtor listed
monthly disposable income of $956.97 and additional expenses-consisting of his TSP contributions and loan repayments-of
$1,041.45. The trustee filed a motion to dismiss based on a presumption
of abuse.2°
The debtor first argued that under the court's prior decision in In re
Garrett,20 1 his projected disposable income could be reduced by both
the TSP contribution and the loan repayment. °2 The court rejected
that argument, stating that In re Garrett applies only in Chapter 13
cases because 11 U.S.C. § 1322(f)20 expressly excludes TSP loan
repayments from a Chapter 13 debtor's disposable income."
In
contrast, "Congress did not provide special treatment for qualified
retirement plan loan repayments in the Chapter 7 means test calcula20
tion." 6

194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

In re Spears, 415 B.R. at 857.
11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (2006).
In re Spears, 415 B.R. at 858 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)).
Id.
402 B.R. 903 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2009).
Id. at 907-08.
Id. at 904-05.
No. 07-3997-3F3, 2008 WL 6049236 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Jan. 18, 2008).
In re Tauter, 402 B.R. at 906 (citing In re Garrett,2008 WL 6049236, at *1).
11 U.S.C. § 1322(f) (2006).
In re Tauter, 402 B.R. at 906.
Id.
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Next, the debtor contended that the contributions and loans were
special circumstances, as provided for in § 707(b)(2)(B)(ii). °6
In
response to this argument, the court discussed two examples of special
circumstances provided for in the statute-serious medical conditions
and active military duty.2 °7 The court subsequently rejected the
debtor's argument, noting that his reasons for making the contributions
20 8
and repaying the loan bore no similarity to the statutory examples.
As to the contribution, it "is an entirely voluntary action, the antithesis
of an expense for which there is no reasonable alternative." 9 As to
the loan repayment, the court acknowledged there may be cases in which
the debtor's reason for borrowing from the TSP may constitute special
circumstances. 1 0 Nevertheless, the court held that this case was not
one of them. 1 Ultimately, because the debtor failed to rebut the
presumption of abuse, the court dismissed his case.2 12
As the court noted, loan repayments to qualified retirement plans are
treated differently in Chapter 7 and Chapter 13.213 In Chapter 7 they
are treated as income whereas in Chapter 13 they are not.2 4 This
creates a scenario in which the debtor can continue to receive the benefit
of those repayments rather than redirecting them to his creditors by
simply converting to Chapter 13. Furthermore, the debtor could argue
this point as a defense to the presumption of abuse. In other words, it
is not really abusive to deduct the loan repayments from income in
Chapter 7 because the creditors would be no better off in Chapter 13.
B.

Good Faith
Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3),"' a bankruptcy court is required
to confirm a plan if, among other things, it is proposed in good faith.
At issue in In re Pearson211 was whether a plan is proposed in good
faith if it provides for paying secured creditors in full before making any
distributions to unsecured creditors. 2 8 The debtors argued that their

206.

Id.

207. Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(B)(i).
208.
209.
210.

In re Tauter, 402 B.R. at 906.
Id.
Id. at 907.

211. Id.
212. Id. at 908.
213. Id. at 907.
214. Id. at 906.
215. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) (2006).

216. Id.
217. 398 B.R. 97 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2008).
218. Id. at 100.
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plan was filed in good faith because the unsecured creditors would not
have received a payout had the debtors filed Chapter 7 instead of
Chapter 13.219 In applying a totality of the circumstances test,
including consideration of the Kitchen factors,22 ° the court noted that
secured creditors are better off under the plan than they would be
outside of bankruptcy.2 1 In addition, the accelerated payments to
secured creditors benefitted the debtors "because secured creditors are
entitled to receive interest until their claims are paid in full."222 So,
while the secured creditors and debtors would benefit from their plan,
the debtors provided no evidence of "unusual or exceptional circumstances" that would warrant those preferences.223 Because the payment
scheme "benefits Debtors to the unfair detriment of their unsecured
creditors," the court concluded that the plan was not proposed in good
faith and denied confirmation.22 '
XI.

CONCLUSION

While 2009 brought little new to bankruptcy law, 2010 promises to be
more interesting. Most notably, the Supreme Court is expected to render
decisions in four bankruptcy cases. Two of the cases have already been
decided. The Court considered the recent limitations imposed by
Congress on the abilities of attorneys for debtors to advise their clients
in Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, PA. v. United States.2 ' The Court
also analyzed the dischargeability of student loans in the absence of a
finding of undue hardship in United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v.
Espinosa.22 At the time this Article went to press, two of the cases
had not yet been decided. The Court will examine the scope of a claimed
And
exemption in the absence of an objection in Schwab v. Reilly.

219. Id. Because the debtors passed the means test, Chapter 7 was a viable option for
them. Id.
220. Id. at 102. In Kitchens v. GeorgiaR.R. Bank & Trust Co. (In re Kitchens), 702
F.2d 885 (11th Cir. 1983), the Eleventh Circuit set forth a nonexclusive list of eleven
factors to consider in the good-faith analysis. Id. at 888-89.
221. In re Pearson,398 B.R. at 104.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 105.
224. Id.
225. 130 S.Ct. 1324 (2010).
226. 130 S.Ct. 1367 (2010).
227. 534 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2049 (U.S. Apr. 27, 2009) (No.
08-538).
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finally, it will determine the meaning of projected disposable income in
Chapter 13 cases in Hamilton v. Lanning.2

228. 545 F.3d 1269 (10th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 487 (U.S. Nov. 2, 2009)
(No. 08-998).

